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“Common Sense is Necessary.” East German Reactions 
to the Oil Crises of the 1970s 
André Steiner ∗ 
Abstract: »‘Man muss die Sache mit Vernunft machen.‘ Reaktionen der DDR 
auf die Ölkrisen der 1970er Jahre«. This article examines the SED leadership’s 
perception of the global oil price increases at the beginning of the 1970s, as 
well as the consequences this had for the GDR. On this basis, the article then 
deals with the economic and political reactions within the GDR. The country 
waived a reform of the wage payment system and increased the use of brown 
coal in the production of electricity, heating, and elsewhere, as well as extend-
ed opencast mining in consequence. The intention was to also cut costs on 
heating oil, petrol, and diesel throughout the economy. The article reveals the 
difficulties of and limitations to the realization of this strategy and the unfor-
tunate consequences. In the short-term, the political and economic survival of 
the GDR could be secured. In the long run, however, these processes played 
their part in the GDR’s economic collapse. 
Keywords: GDR, East Germany, oil prices, heating oil, brown coal, tariff project. 
1.  Introduction1 
By 1973, the year associated with the first oil price shock, the East German 
outpost of the Soviet empire, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), had 
achieved reconsolidation after the economic crisis of 1969/70. This had made 
additional imports necessary, however. As in other Eastern bloc countries, in 
1971 the leadership of the ruling communist party, the Sozialistische Ein-
heitspartei Deutschlands (SED), had taken an about-turn in economic and 
social policy, following the failure of economic reforms in the 1960s and the 
bloody suppression of worker unrest in Poland in December of 1970. The new 
SED leader, Erich Honecker, now replaced the modernization course pursued 
by his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, with a policy of conciliation, so as to se-
cure his own power and that of the SED. The workers were to be pacified by 
improving the provision of consumer goods at stable prices and an expanded 
social policy. The latter was, in turn, supposed to incentivize better perfor-
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mance; albeit, corresponding economic incentives remained weak. Neverthe-
less, providing consumer goods and social welfare demanded further resources 
and imports. Given that GDR products were not sufficiently competitive on 
world markets, exports could not be increased in a way that would have al-
lowed returns to cover the higher import costs. Those in charge of the GDR 
economy repeatedly pointed to the inherent discrepancy between political 
targets and economic possibilities, but the SED leadership under Honecker 
chose to ignore these warnings.2 This was the scenario the oil price increase hit 
in October 1973, an event that was caused partly by the oil-producing Gulf 
States and by Arab oil producers’ embargo on the United States and the Neth-
erlands, in reaction to the Fourth Arab-Israeli War. 
This paper examines the question of how a Soviet-style, centrally planned 
economy – in this case, the GDR – reacted to the consequences of these events. 
These reactions have not yet been sufficiently examined. Here they are ex-
plored using internal documents of the SED and the State Planning Commis-
sion, which are now held by the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv). The 
paper’s first part deals with the SED leadership’s perception of these develop-
ments and their consequences on prices within the Eastern economic union, the 
Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA, also known in the West as the 
Comecon). The next part looks at the strategic economic and political decisions 
made by SED leadership in this new situation, before then examining the im-
plementation of these measures. Finally, the results of and the limitations to the 
restructuring processes then planned and their consequences for the existence 
of the East German state are examined. 
2.  The Development of World Market Prices: Perceptions 
and Consequences within the CMEA 
World market prices for crude oil had risen since the end of the 1960s in small 
but noticeable steps.3 In the two years up to October 1973 alone, the rise was 
27 percent.4 In the GDR too, the strong upward trend in prices was noticed in 
raw materials. In May 1973, the SED’s Department of Planning and Finance 
reported to Günter Mittag, the party’s secretary of economic affairs, that prices 
for raw materials had, with few exceptions, risen severely since the early 
1970s. Various explanations were provided: the long economic upturn in the 
West and the resulting growth in the demand for raw materials, increased diffi-
culties in the excavation of raw materials, the acceleration in inflation, more 
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speculative buying during the dollar currency crisis but also the increased buy-
ing on the part of the socialist countries themselves, and the politically moti-
vated distortion of offers, as exemplified by the earlier resolutions of Arab 
countries on price rises. Moreover, the SED department already recognized that 
the development of world market prices “represented a strong pressure to 
change CMEA contract prices for raw materials to the disadvantage of the 
GDR.”5 Up to this point, CMEA prices had been fixed for the period of a five-
year plan on the basis of the average world market prices over the previous 
five-year period. 
Initially, East German leadership hoped that CMEA prices would remain 
unchanged. However, in light of the comments made by the Department of the 
Central Committee (ZK), it was no surprise when, in November 1973, the 
Foreign Trade Minister of the Soviet Union, which covered the bulk of the 
GDR’s oil demands, indicated to his East German colleagues that oil prices 
would have to be renegotiated. He pointed out that while purchasing raw mate-
rials in the West in order to supply these to Eastern bloc countries, the Soviets 
in fact had to pay a great deal more than they were getting back at the point of 
sale. Similar signals came from Moscow.6 Upon meeting with the Soviet party 
leader Leonid Brezhnev in mid-June of 1974, Honecker was informed that 
prices for oil and other raw materials in capitalist countries were expected to 
continue rising. Whilst “mutually acceptable solutions” were necessary, Brezh-
nev’s immediate demand was that Eastern bloc countries carry their share of 
the costs involved in oil tapping and transport.7 It was left to the person in 
charge of planning in Moscow, Nikolai Baibakow, to inform Gerhard Schürer, 
his East German colleague, an entire month later that CMEA prices needed to 
be adjusted to world market prices.8 
Shortly thereafter – in early August of 1974 – the Soviet Foreign Trade Min-
ister officially informed his East German colleague that the analysis of interna-
tional markets had revealed that price relations had “fundamentally changed.” 
Following the rise in prices for raw materials, fuels, and metals, the prices for 
many finished products had increased too. This was “a global process” and “a 
far-reaching and irreversible development […], in Soviet opinion a return to 
earlier price levels was not realistic.” However, price fixing in trade between 
                                                             
5  Abt. Planung und Finanzen an Mittag, 18.5.1973: Entwicklung der Weltmarktpreise für 
ausgewählte Rohstoffe, 16.5.1973, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen 
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had, in fact, put up petroleum prices on several occasions since 1971. Cf. Hohensee 2002, 
38-43. 
6  Ahrens 2000, 304. 
7  Niederschrift über die Gespräche zwischen dem Ersten Sekretär des ZK der SED, Erich Ho-
necker, und dem Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU, Leonid Iljitsch Breshnew, am 18. Juni 
1974 in Moskau, in: Hertle and Jarausch 2006, 76-7. 
8  Ahrens 2000, 304-5. 
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CMEA countries could not be carried out in isolation from the world market, 
and the overall increase in price levels had to be accounted for. These devel-
opments were seen as a result of the contradictions between capitalist industrial 
states and developing countries. The latter had to produce the bulk of raw mate-
rials and were forced by the dictates of the “imperialist monopolies” to supply 
industrial nations at low prices. This was now going to end. In addition, as the 
Soviet Foreign Trade Minister stated, “the USSR has been forced (for a long 
time) to sell its raw materials at the same low prices that capitalist countries have 
been paying to developing countries. This has led to huge losses.” So the sugges-
tion was made to create a flexible price fixing system with moving averages for 
the CMEA. Concluding his arguments, the Soviet representative added that those 
uncertain whether the current price development was truly irreversible should 
lend their support to the Soviet suggestion for more flexibility.9 
Three days later Honecker discussed the consequences of this announcement 
with close colleagues. He declared, “I’m in favour of accepting these demands. 
We’ll not escape unscathed, but the consequences for the GDR must remain 
within acceptable limits.” He added, “The whole affair should be dealt with 
carefully to prevent any panic developing.” In any case, detrimental effects for 
the general population had to be avoided, “otherwise we can resign immediate-
ly, and of course that’s something we do not want to do.” In consequence, the 
price increase would be applied to only industrial prices and not to the retail 
prices paid by the general population.10 The representative from the State Plan-
ning Commission (SPK) emphasized that the period of time selected as the 
basis to calculate the moving average should be extended, given that every 
additional year was to the GDR’s advantage. Mittag, however, believed the 
very basis of planning was in question and announced, “Planning is not possi-
ble without fixed prices.” The consequences needed to be evaluated, and an 
independent stance had to be developed prior to the approaching negotiations 
with the Soviet Union.11 So, on the one hand, this initial reaction included the 
realization that the fundamentals of the Soviet-style planned economy were 
being questioned. On the other, the decision was made to not apply the changes 
in world market prices to private consumers. The consequence was that this 
price rise had to be carried by the national budget, which tended to increase 
domestic debts.12  
                                                             
9  Minister für Außenhandel: Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft mit dem Minister für 
Außenhandel der UdSSR, Genossen Patolitschew, am 6. August 1974, 7.8.1974, Bundesarchiv 
Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BArch) DE 1/58705, Bl. 89-97. Cf. Ahrens 2000, 305. 
10  In the GDR, the prices valid for producers and those for private consumers were separated 
by a complex and practically unfathomable system of subsidies and taxes.  
11  SPK, Staatssekretär: Persönliche Niederschrift über eine Beratung beim 1. Sekretär des 
Zentralkomitees der SED am 9.8.1974, 9.8.1974, BArch DE 1/58586. 
12  Cf. on the latter point: Ahrens 2000, 306. 
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Over the following weeks and months, the SPK often recalculated the addi-
tional burden that was expected on [HSR: “of”] the GDR under the new price-
fixing regime. These estimates were based on assumptions about the future 
development of world market prices and the volume of imported supplies, 
which, especially in the first case, were not certain. This aside, the size of the 
additional burden was lower in every new forecast than the previous. In the 
latter half of September 1974, it was assumed that the prices for raw material 
imports from the Soviet Union would increase by 20-25 percent. Covering 
these additional costs would have demanded greater output, but this, in turn, 
would have demanded more raw materials, and these were not available. The 
necessary savings would have to be made mainly in investments.13  
On the basis of these calculations, the GDR government attempted to ward 
off the pricing changes, employing various tactical explanations. In the end, 
they were “convinced” by the argument presented by the Soviet representa-
tives: there was no alternative to the orientation towards world market prices, 
otherwise it would be necessary to refer to national prime costs, which would 
have pushed the level of costs up and negatively affect productivity.14 When 
the heads of the Soviet and East German Planning Commissions met at the 
beginning of December 1974, the Moscow representative “sold” the sugges-
tions for CMEA contract prices for the period 1976-1980 as a compromise; 
after all, the resulting burden would be shared with partner countries. Indeed, 
the burden for the other CMEA countries would have been twice as high if 
current world market prices had been chosen instead of a five-year moving 
price basis. In this matter, the head of the Soviet planning committee GOS-
PLAN announced that the Soviet Union would agree to the GDR request to 
postpone the additional burden as a loan for five to seven years. For the year 
1975, Moscow departed from the original suggestion to fix the contract prices on 
the basis of the years 1973 and 1974, “because this would mean only the years 
with high world market prices are included.” Instead it was proposed to select the 
years 1972 to 1974.15 That very same day, Honecker informed Brezhnev of their 
agreement to the price corrections. As he explained, it seemed expedient to select 
the mid-range world market prices from the years 1972-1974 for the year of 1975 
and a moving five-year basis for the new five-year plan for 1976 to 1980. Never-
theless, as the SED head emphasized, “I’ll be open. From our point of view, this 
is not the best decision.” He was especially bothered by the moving basis, but did 
not want to raise any objections if the other countries agreed. However, the finan-
                                                             
13  Wenzel an Klopfer, [23.9.1974]: Zur Vorlage: Neufestlegung der RGW-Vertragspreise, BArch 
DE 1/58705, Bl. 299-305. Cf. Klopfer an Schürer, 16.8.1974: SPK: Erste volkswirtschaftliche 
Einschätzung der für 1975 angekündigten Veränderung von RGW-Vertragspreisen im Han-
del mit der UdSSR, 12.8.1974, BArch DE 1/58586.  
14  Ahrens 2000, 307-8. 
15  Gerhard Schürer: Information über ein Gespräch zwischen Genossen Schürer und Genossen 
Baibakow am 9.12.1974 zu Preisfragen, 9.12.1974, BArch DE 1/58586. 
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cial consequences for the GDR would be “very arduous,” which was why he 
requested that the resulting debts be credited in the trade balance.16 
Nevertheless, during further talks shortly before Christmas of 1974, GDR 
representatives did not tire of questioning the moving price basis and of argu-
ing in favor of a five-year fixed price basis. But the GOSPLAN head empha-
sized in talks with Honecker that Brezhnev “had personally examined all as-
pects of the price issue.” On his departure he had been informed that “the 
comrades [in East Berlin] need to be told in a friendly fashion that the time has 
come to basically accept the current proposal.” After this hardly discreet order, 
the Soviet representatives again pointed out that, in fact, the moving price basis 
secured a gentle adjustment to the development of world market prices, so that 
“some countries do not face immense difficulties after 1980.” Nevertheless, 
Honecker was especially concerned that “retail prices are not pushed up under 
the new conditions.” He said further, “We must not forget our situation in the 
fight against imperialist ideology nor the flood of visitors coming to the GDR 
[i.e., citizens of the Federal Republic and West Berlin]. A certain standard of 
living is essential.” In the end, Honecker emphasized his conviction that solu-
tions could be found and that he was “more optimistic after the talks than he 
had been before.”17 
Thus, CMEA prices were now to be adjusted annually on the basis of the 
average of world market prices over the previous five years; for the transitional 
year of 1975, adjustments were based on the average of the last three years. To 
compensate for the additional costs, exports were to be increased between 1975 
and 1980, especially to the USSR. The remaining debts were to be credited by 
the Soviet Union.18 This was probably the reason for Honecker’s cautious 
optimism; albeit, this later proved to be more difficult than first thought. Alt-
hough the new financial burden, coupled with the continuation of Honecker’s 
social program, represented, in the words of Peter Hübner, “a barely calculable 
danger zone,” the SED leadership also identified two stabilizing factors. On the 
one hand, the Soviet Union’s own economic and strategic military interests 
alone meant that it would not drop their East German ally. On the other, the 
crisis in the West was an opportunity to emphasize the GDR’s own merits and 
strengths – in an ideological but also practical sense.19  
CMEA oil prices then doubled within one year, but this still left the GDR in 
a relatively good position, because world market prices almost tripled between 
                                                             
16  Honecker an Breshnew, 9.12.1974, BArch DE 1/58586. 
17  Niederschrift über die Beratung zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und Genossen Baibakow 
am 21.12.1974, 21.12.1974, BArch DE 1/58586. 
18  Honecker: Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED, 3.1.1975: Bericht über die Ergebnisse 
der Beratungen mit Genossen Baibakow und Genossen Patolitschew vom 21. bis 23.12. in 
Berlin, 23.12.1975, BArch DE 1/58586. 
19  Hübner and Hübner 2008, 391-2. 
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1971 and 1975.20 Between 1971 and 1978 the price for oil within the CMEA 
increased 412.1 percent, and within the “non-socialist economic area” 594.1 
percent.21 Even the increased prices in CMEA trade remained lucrative for the 
GDR, as long as both world market prices continued to rise and the Soviet 
Union still provided the same level of oil supplies. In this case, the CMEA 
supply price was always lower than the current world market price. At the same 
time, the prices for the mineral oil products exported by the GDR to the West 
were orientated towards world market prices, which continued to represent a 
significant potential for profit-making. Until 1976, the GDR still paid 50 percent 
of the world market price for oil imported from the Soviet Union, while in 1978 it 
was already almost 80 percent.22 Nevertheless, after the second oil price shock hit 
the world market in 1979/80, the relation between the prices again fell 46 percent 
in 1980, and in 1985, once CMEA prices had quickly “followed suit,” the GDR 
had to buy Soviet oil at what was roughly the world market price.23  
In return, the Soviet Union demanded “hard” goods, which the GDR could 
have exported to the West, resulting in an even stronger orientation of East 
German production to meet Soviet needs. So the GDR found itself more and 
more in a Catch-22: the aim of reducing debts in the West required products that 
could be sold on the world markets, but the purchase of raw materials at relative-
ly good prices required an intensification of exports to the USSR. Thus “neither 
of the two economic areas [could be] neglected in export policy terms.”24 
A further point should be remembered: GDR representatives had been close-
ly following the development of world market oil prices since the early 1970s 
at the latest, and by 1974, it had already been assumed that these changes were 
irreversible.25 In addition, there was also early recognition of the fact that this 
would have consequences for CMEA prices. The moving price basis then in-
troduced took into account both changes on the world market and the price 
stability requirements of a Soviet-style planned economy. This did not mean 
that this principle was given up.  
3.  Strategic Economic Policy Decisions in the GDR 
Honecker’s statements quoted above illustrate how, even when faced with 
these new costs, it was not considered an option to reduce or even terminate the 
                                                             
20  Ahrens 2000, 309. 
21  Calculation based on Böhm an Mittag, 9.8.1979: Faktenmaterial zu den Belastungen der 
Volkswirtschaft der DDR, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1092, Bl.294f. 
22  Schröter 1996, 114. See also: Karlsch and Stokes 2003, 341. 
23  Calculation based on: [Abt. Planung und Finanzen an Mittag] Anforderungen, die an die 
Volkswirtschaft der DDR gestellt wurden, 21.11.1988, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1601, Bl.168. 
24  Ahrens 2000, 281. 
25  According to Schröter, this was first the case in 1978: Schröter 1996, 114-5. 
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comprehensive social and consumer program introduced under his aegis (albeit, 
its economic basis was never secure). At the same time, these developments 
again reduced the scope for such expenditure. Moreover, the consequences of 
the higher oil prices also had an indirect influence on this program.  
The economic feasibility of the social program also depended to a decisive 
degree on whether the welfare benefits for the working population could be 
linked to performance incentives. So, after 1972, plans were made to examine the 
whole wage structure and average work rates in order to overcome the existing 
tendency of “levelling down” and to strengthen individual performance incen-
tives.26 Performance standards had been diluted, as work on wages and rates “had 
been neglected for years” and because factories had fixed these “on their own 
authority.”27 This situation was now supposed to be remedied by an ambitious 
initiative to adjust pay scales, in order to “determinedly reduce wage differences 
that were not based on performance variations.” New pay scales were to be grad-
ed according to the national economic significance of each industrial sector, work 
rates were to be based on technical differences, and employees were subsequently 
reclassified stepwise into wage groups. Yet, in the process, no wages were to be 
cut, to avoid any negative consequences for individuals.28 As a result, this initia-
tive ultimately proved to be so costly that it was thought unaffordable. This was 
explicitly explained in terms of the expenditure increases, which resulted from 
the changes in CMEA price fixing in conjunction with the need to guarantee 
consumer price stability.29 In fact, the tariff project was dropped in 1975. This 
was later interpreted as a sign of helplessness on the part of the SED leadership 
given the initiative’s true significance.30 At the same time, this development again 
reflected that the social and consumer program was regarded as sacrosanct and its 
economic basis as secondary. 
Aside from these more indirect reactions, there was the question of how the 
SED leadership should react to the new situation in terms of its energy and fuel 
policy. The national fuels concept, as defined in April 1971, had still been 
carried by the spirit of the sixties’ modernization strategy, which aimed at 
replacing brown coal and hard coal with oil, natural gas, and nuclear power. 
The concept assumed that Soviet oil supplies would increase. In the course of 
                                                             
26  Ministerrat: Beschluß zu den Grundsätzen unserer Lohnpolitik vom 21.6.1972, BArch 
DC20-I/3-964. 
27  Abt. Planung und Finanzen: Information zur Situation auf dem Gebiet des Arbeitslohnes, 
24.3.1972, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1084; Abt. Planung und Finanzen: Information zu Dispro-
portionen in den Effektivlöhnen, 12.4.1972, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1084; Rademacher: Infor-
mation über den Stand der Arbeit am volkswirtschaftlichen Tarifprojekt zur Durchführung 
des Politbüro-Beschlusses vom 3.September 1974, 13.1.1975, BArch DE1/58581. 
28  Staatssekretär für Arbeit und Löhne, Rademacher an Schürer, 19.4.1974: Beschlußentwurf. 
Volkswirtschaftliches Tarifprojekt, 18.4.1974, BArch DE1/58581. 
29  Schürer an Krolikowski: Vorschlag zur Arbeit am volkswirtschaftlichen Tarifprojekt, 
27.1.1975, BArch DE1/58559. 
30  Hübner and Hübner 2008, 406-7, 415. 
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the relevant negotiations, however, it soon became clear that these hopes would 
not be fulfilled to the desired degree. In addition, demands that the GDR should 
participate in the incumbent investments for the exploitation of raw materials 
grew stronger.31 Given the difficulties in securing the imports thought neces-
sary from the Soviet Union, at the end of 1971 there was already a marked shift 
in approach to the issue of the long-term fuel and energy balance: “Energy 
demands are to be met by the maximum utilization of domestic fuel resources 
(brown coal and low-caloric natural gas).” However, the large investments 
involved in the mining and processing of raw brown coal meant that, in turn, 
“the overall growth in energy demands needs to be covered by additional in-
creases in imports of oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel, in the context of the 
development of socialist economic integration.” Due to a lack of technical 
preparation, the mining of raw brown coal could not in fact expand by 1980 as 
planned. In this situation, the calculated demand for fuel imports needed to be 
guaranteed, but this was something which had been omitted.32 Even if domestic 
brown coal resources were to be better exploited after 1980, with a drop in 
expected oil and natural gas imports, the problem remained – as was empha-
sized – that other still-insecure plans were necessary for the following years. 
There was some clarity about the broader consequences. In contrast to all other 
industrial states, the GDR not only needed to continue but to expand the opera-
tion of producer gas plants. Private households continued to operate mainly 
individual stoves fuelled by brown coal briquettes. This meant “the pollution of 
the biosphere with dust and sulphur products […] will increase, especially in 
conurbations.”33 Prior to the decision of the Politburo, the ZK department re-
sponsible for the primary industry emphasized that the entire plan “was deci-
sively dependent on the results of negotiations with the Soviet Union.” In par-
ticular, there was no solution prepared for the case of imports not being secured 
at a certain minimal level.34 Nevertheless, the SED leadership accepted these 
plans at the beginning of March 1973.35 
However, it already became clear in the summer of 1973 that the Soviet Un-
ion would not provide the supplies of raw materials to the desired extent.36 In 
                                                             
31  Ahrens 2000, 274-6. 
32  SPK, Abt. Energiewirtschaft: Entwurf der Vorlage an das Präsidium des Ministerrates und das 
Politbüro des ZK der SED über die langfristige Brennstoff- und Energiebilanz bis 1990, 
14.12.1972, BArch DE1/58489, Bl.218f., 239. Cf. also: Ministerium für Kohle und Energie: 
Entwurf der Vorlage an das Präsidium des Ministerrates und das Politbüro des ZK der SED 
über die langfristige Brennstoff- und Energiebilanz bis 1990, BArch DE1/58489, Bl.273-313. 
33  SPK, Abt. Energiewirtschaft: Erläuterungen zum Entwurf der Vorlage über die langfristige 
Brennstoff- und Energiebilanz, 14.12.1972, BArch DE1/58489, Bl.90-108. 
34  Abt. Grundstoffindustrie: Stellungnahme zur Vorlage an das Präsidium des Ministerrates und 
das Politbüro des ZK der SED über die langfristige Brennstoff- und Energiebilanz bis 1990, 
28.2.1973, SAPMO-BA DY 30 J IV2/2A/1664, Bl.70. 
35  Cf. SAPMO-BA DY 30 J IV 2/2A/1664. 
36  Ahrens 2000, 277. 
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reaction to this and to the explosion of world market oil prices, the national 
concept for securing raw materials was reworked in the spring of 1974. A re-
port on the long-term energy supply up to 1990 stated explicitly that the 
“changing situation in the market for oil in the non-socialist economic area and 
the increasingly complicated situation with regard to securing further oil re-
sources from the USSR demand new economic considerations and assess-
ment.” It was now the case that “[a]s the limits on supplies of oil and natural 
gas are continually getting tighter, these energy sources should primarily be 
reserved as industrial feedstock. Heat generation processes should continue to 
be developed on the basis of solid fuels.” So in the long term, raw brown coal 
was also supposed to provide the decisive basis for the generation of electrical 
power and heat. Fuel imports were to mainly come from CMEA states, and all 
possibilities were to be exploited to increase imports from the Soviet Union, 
especially through investment. In addition, the projected capacities for nuclear 
power plants were to be realized. In particular, it was also stated that the chem-
ical industry’s organic raw materials base should include oil and natural gas, as 
well as coal.37 Yet, in this context, it was also emphasized that “meeting the 
growing demand for fuels and raw materials is a global problem” and that, 
given this, “the long-term provision of raw materials for the GDR’s national 
economy is increasingly becoming the central issue for any realistic long-term 
concept.” Significantly, more brown coal mining was necessary, as the USSR 
would not provide the desired supplies of oil and natural gas until 1980. How-
ever, this demanded new hauling capacities, which in turn required more 
equipment and construction work, which were not yet available.38 
Thus, in the spring of 1974, the strategic course had already been set to fur-
ther expand opencast mining and brown coal consumption as a direct conse-
quence of both world market developments and the Soviet Union’s limited 
ability and readiness to provide supplies. This questions the commonly adopted 
assumption that the GDR had “first taken its time” before reacting five years 
later, as a result of the CMEA price regulations.39  
                                                             
37  SPK: Präzisierte Konzeption zur langfristigen Rohstoffsicherung der Volkswirtschaft der DDR 
im Zeitraum bis 1990 (Entwurf, April 1974), BArch DE 1/58486. 
38  SPK: Bericht über die Arbeit an der langfristigen Konzeption bis 1990 (Entwurf), 10.4.1974, 
BArch DE 1/58486. 
39  Examples of earlier research in the West on this question include Wolfgang Stinglwagner: 
Die Energiewirtschaft der DDR. Unter Berücksichtigung internationaler Effizienzvergleiche, 
Bonn 1985 (worthwhile); Werner Gruhn, Günter Lauterbach: Energiepolitik und Energiefor-
schung in der DDR. Herausforderungen, Pläne und Maßnahmen, Erlangen 1986; Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung (Ed.): (Joachim Kahlert): Die Energiepolitik der DDR. Mängelverwaltung 
zwischen Kernkraft und Braunkohle, Bonn 1988; Jochen Bethkenhagen: Die Energiewirt-
schaft in den kleineren Mitgliedsstaaten des Rates für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe. Ent-
wicklungstendenzen in den achtziger Jahren, DIW Heft 113, Berlin 1990. Harm adopted this 
interpretation from the DIW which was first quoted in the historical literature in Schröter 
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During the following years, several problems became intertwined. Honeck-
er’s social and consumer program had priority and required as many imports as 
the investment needs of the national economy. Exports, on the other hand, 
always failed to meet targets, given the competitive deficits of East German 
products. This situation was further worsened by the higher costs for raw materi-
als, especially for oil, whether imported from the West or the East. The outcome 
was that GDR debts soared, while more-or-less-successful attempts were made to 
replace imports or to cut costs at home. In the spring of 1977, a SPK statement on 
further steps, which clarified the various problems involved, concluded that “the 
fundamental issue is guaranteeing the GDR’s solvency.”40 The situation had 
become even more severe following further price increases for various raw mate-
rials on the world markets and consequently within the CMEA too, as well as due 
to the stoppage of agricultural supplies from the Soviet Union.41 
In the summer of 1977, the SED leadership and government had already de-
cided upon a number of measures to save fuel and heating oil, in order to as-
suage the lack of hard currency. Based on concepts that had been drawn up two 
years prior, a further refinement of the available oil was planned in order to 
increase the share of the yield in light distillates. As such, fuel supplies in gen-
eral and industrial feedstock were to be secured to the detriment of heating oil 
production. With the intent to reduce the use of heating oil, steam and hot-
water generators for solid fuels were supposed to be produced more rapidly and 
no further oil-fired boilers were to be constructed. At the same time, an expan-
sion of opencast coal mining was necessary. Ultimately the aim was to export 
the now surplus of heating oil to markets in the West in order to reduce pres-
sure on the balance of payments. Similarly, demands were made to use petrol 
and diesel economically in all areas.42 Along with the SED leadership’s 1978 
decisions to restructure the chemical industry and to further develop coal chem-
istry, this marks the introduction of concrete measures that were in line with the 
change of course already made in 1974. Accordingly, brown coal was to re-
place oil as the chemical industry’s raw material base (at least as the tendency). 
Across the whole economy, power generation from oil and gas was to be re-
placed by raw brown coal as much as possible, and energy consumption was to 
be reduced. The oil that was still available was reserved as industrial feedstock, 
                                                                                                                                
1996, 114. Consequently, this interpretation was adopted more or less comprehensively. Cf. 
for example. Steiner 2010, 161. 
40  [SPK:] Zur weiteren Durchführung des Volkswirtschaftsplans 1977 sowie zur Ausarbeitung 
des Volkswirtschaftsplanes 1978 (Entwurf), 12.5.1977, BArch DE 1/58633. 
41  Vorschläge zur Durchführung der Beschlüsse des IX. Parteitags der SED unter Berück-
sichtigung der weiteren wesentlichen Verschärfung der außenwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, 
20.4.1977, BArch DE1/58676, Bl. 85-100. 
42  Protokoll Nr.26/77 der Sitzung des Politbüros des ZK der SED am 28.Juni 1977, SAPMO-BA 
DY 30 J IV2/2A/2085; Zur Durchführung der Konzeption für den effektiveren Einsatz impor-
tierter Energieträger, 12.12.1979, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1125, Bl.169f. 
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while at the same time the operation of coal chemistry was to be continued and 
expanded.43 However, these decisions were contradictory, given that coal 
chemistry was not only much more costly than petro-chemistry, but also had 
higher energy demands, which was an obstacle to the goal of saving energy.44 
4.  Restructuring Measures and Cutbacks in the National 
Economy 
Despite the strategic decision in favor of expanding brown coal mining, in-
vestment initially remained limited. Such investments had been massively 
increased between 1971 and 1973, mostly as a reaction to the energy crisis of 
1969/70, and represented almost 9 percent of all industrial investments in 1973. 
But this proportion then decreased during the 1970s.45 Investment increases 
remained limited because the main targets set for the domestic economy – the 
expansion of private consumption and increase in social expenditure, accompa-
nied by selective modernization – already overstretched the national economy 
and had the tendency to increase foreign debts. It was not until 1980/81, after 
the second oil price shock, that investment in the brown coal industry increased 
by 12.9 and 11.3 percent respectively. During the 1980s (1980-88), overall 
investment grew an average of 4.6 percent per year, while investments across 
the whole national economy only went up by 1.9 percent.46 So investment in 
the brown coal industry was clearly disproportionate. Although this show of 
strength did intensify the mining of brown coal by an average of 3.0 percent 
per year between 1978 and 1985, it declined by an average of 0.3 percent dur-
ing the following years and until 1988.47 The discrepancy between the re-
sources used and the results achieved was primarily a consequence of the con-
tinual deterioration of mining conditions, which in turn led to rising costs. By 
                                                             
43  Schröter 1996, 115-7.; Abt. Grundstoffindustrie des ZK der SED, Ministerium für Chemische 
Industrie, Ministerium für Kohle und Energie: Stellungnahme zum Informationsmaterial der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR über Stand und Probleme bei der Nutzung fossiler 
Kohlenstoffträger, 11.12.1979, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1140, Bl. 474ff. 
44  Schröter 1996, 118. 
45  Calculation based on Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik (SZS): Statistisches Jahrbuch 
über ausgewählte Kennziffern der Grundfondsökonomie und Investitionen 1981, BArch 
DE2/20217. 
46  Calculation based on SZS: Statistisches Jahrbuch über ausgewählte Kennziffern der Grund-
fondsökonomie und Investitionen 1981, BArch DE2/20217; SZS: Statistisches Jahrbuch über 
ausgewählte Kennziffern der Grundfondsökonomie und Investitionen 1985, BArch 
DE2/20612; SZS: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Industrie 1989, BArch DE2/21006; Statistisches 
Amt der DDR 1990, 15. 
47  Calculation based on Statistisches Amt der DDR 1990, 24. 
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1977, these had risen by 50.7 percent compared to 1970.48 From 1980 until 
1988, capital expenditure per ton of extracted raw brown coal rose by more 
than 70 percent.49 Moreover, the expansion of brown coal mining tied up sub-
stantial capacities in mechanical engineering, which were then not available for 
export to markets in the West. Given the deficit in the balance of payments, this 
worsened existing problems. 
The conversion from oil and gas to brown coal as a source of energy, as well 
as to coal chemistry, was barely underway when oil prices on the world market 
exploded again in 1979/80 and created additional difficulties for planning in 
the GDR. By now, exchange relations had worsened fundamentally, as the 
following example illustrates: “In 1975, the GDR imported 161 tons of oil from 
the socialist economic area for one exported lorry, and in 1979 it imported 136 
tons of oil. Within the non-socialist economic area, the exchange brought 90 
tons in 1975 and 71 tons in 1979.”50 Faced with this situation, the SPK came to 
the conclusion that “the fundamental changes in the conditions of foreign trade 
and their recent intensification demand absolute consequences for economic 
policy in the GDR.”51 In this context, even the otherwise sacrosanct consumer 
prices for basic goods were questioned, although Honecker still rejected any 
changes in principal, commenting that “if we do so, the Politburo might as well 
just step down immediately, and the government too.”52 Instead the proposed 
changes were pushed through. 
Nevertheless, the program to replace heating oil came to a slow start only 
because enterprises and combines – i.e., centrally directed conglomerates, 
which included connected enterprises – apparently still assumed they would 
continue to receive the amount of heating oil they required in order to operate 
production cost effectively. It was necessary to repeat requests to thoroughly 
examine the projected use of heating oil in all areas. Big industrial users were 
meant too, such as the Petrochemisches Kombinat Schwedt, which used only 5 
percent of its fuel consumption as industrial feedstock.53 On the one hand, it 
also became clear that the amount of raw brown coal required for the fuel con-
version was not always available due to insufficient production capacities, a 
                                                             
48  Calculation based on Böhm an Mittag, 9.8.1979: Faktenmaterial zu den Belastungen der 
Volkswirtschaft der DDR, SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1092, Bl.288. 
49  Calculation based on [Abt. Planung und Finanzen an Mittag] Anforderungen, die an die 
Volkswirtschaft der DDR gestellt wurden, 21.11.1988, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1601, Bl.178. 
50  Wolff an Honecker: Zur Entwicklung des Energieverbrauchs von 1971 bis 1979, 2.12.1980, 
SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1125, Bl. 466-472. 
51  SPK: Gegenwärtiger Stand und Entscheidungsvorschläge zur Fertigstellung der staatlichen 
Aufgaben für den Volkswirtschaftsplan 1980, 6.8.1979, BArch DE 1/58719, Bl. 40-85. 
52  Notizen zur Beratung des Politbüros des ZK der SED zum Planentwurf 1980 am 27. Novem-
ber 1979, 27.11.1979, BArch DE 1/58719, Bl.434-456. Cf. on this issue: Steiner 2008, 316-8; 
Malycha 2012. The consequences regarding the industrial prices are beyond the scope of 
this article. 
53  Genossen Mittag: Zu Heizöl, 8.12.1979, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1140, Bl. 466-471. 
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situation Günter Mittag railed against in March 1980, saying “the cardinal point 
is that brown coal must be available so that fuel conversion can take place.” On 
the other hand, an operational report revealed that the relevant government guide-
lines were often unknown in enterprises and combines. Moreover, it also 
emerged that heating oil supplies could be secured and ordered as desired. There 
were no controls, which, in the eyes of Günter Mittag, represented “a very serious 
situation,” and state price-fixing again created the wrong incentives.54 
Aside from these aspects, the boilers suitable for raw brown coal were avail-
able in sufficient numbers only after quite some delay. Brown coal and boilers 
were not supplied according to plan until the autumn of 1980. Nonetheless, the 
fuel conversion process still suffered from “serious deficits,” as stated in a 
report submitted to Mittag, which were now identified as due mainly to short-
falls in construction work. The outcome was that the projected savings in heat-
ing oil for 1980 and 1981 remained unattainable. According to the report, the 
allocated supplies still allowed too much scope for the use of refined or import-
ed fuels. The report pointed out that  
the key issue is the creation of permanent brown coal consumers. So long as 
boiler plants that still operate with heating oil and natural gas, or with hard coal 
and briquettes, have not been technologically modified, the plants will remain 
potential consumers and will continually demand the authorization of these 
fuels, with reference to the fact that they are vital to maintaining production tar-
gets. 
To combat this situation, calls were made to more tightly control the fuel con-
version process.55 Whether this alone would have helped is questionable. 
The replacement of heating oil and other efforts to save and substitute fuels 
then gained renewed impetus in 1981, when the Soviet Union announced cuts 
in oil supplies of roughly two million tons from 1982. These cuts – the some-
what dramatic circumstances of which have been frequently described else-
where56 – were not really a consequence of or a reaction to the international 
energy crisis, but were due to the Soviet Union’s domestic economic problems. 
Nevertheless these cuts played their part in worsening the GDR’s already viru-
lent balance of payments crisis. Now, more oil had to be imported, not only 
from the “non-socialist economic areas,” but also from the Soviet Union, in 
return for hard currencies, in order to make full use of capacities and to guaran-
tee exports to markets in the West. This further increased the pressure to re-
                                                             
54  Niederschrift über die Beratung beim Genossen Mittag zu Fragen der Versorgung der DDR 
mit Brennstoffen und Energie und der rationellen Energieanwendung am Freitag, den 7. 
März 1980, DY 3023/1125, Bl.240-257. 
55  Abt. Grundstoffindustrie an Mittag: [Durchsetzung der Umstellungsbeschlüsse], 28.10.1980, 
SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1125, Bl.385-388. Cf. also: Abt. Forschung und technische Entwicklung 
an Mittag, 12.11.1980: Wichtige Fakten und Probleme aus der Beratung der Zentralen Ener-
giekommission am 31.10.1980, 11.11.1980, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1125, Bl.448-453. 
56  Cf. for example Hertle 1995, 320-2; Karlsch and Stokes 2003, 341-2. 
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place heating oil more quickly with raw brown coal or with domestic natural 
gas as a heating energy source. So the decision was made to modify or newly 
construct an additional 100 heating stations in 1982, involving a capital in-
vestment of 1.6 billion marks in the short term. In total, a capital outlay of 7 
billion marks was planned for the period up to 1985, in conjunction with the 
cuts in Soviet oil supplies. But this was insufficient even in the eyes of the 
SPK. Further investments seemed necessary if the exploitation of raw brown 
coal and domestic natural gas was to increase.57 
Ultimately, the conversion program to replace heating oil and imported nat-
ural gas cost 12 billion marks between 1979 and 1984, which represented the 
modification of 3200 heating stations. As a result, the domestic consumption of 
heating oil was reduced from 8.4 million tons in 1979 to 1.9 million tons in 
1985; thus, annual demand was cut by 6.5 million tons. One third was replaced 
by solid fuels, that is mainly raw brown coal, one quarter by imported natural 
gas and another quarter by domestic natural gas and city gas. Seventeen percent 
of the reduction resulted from fuel-saving measures. The biggest savings, as 
compared to the use of raw brown coal, were actually made between 1982 and 
1984.58 Owing to the fact that the economized oil products were profitably sold 
in the West, they were “a significant factor that reduced some of the pressure on 
the balance of payments in the non-socialist economic area between 1981 and 
1985,” as was retrospectively pointed out in SED headquarters.59 Yet there was a 
great discrepancy between the resources put in and the actual gain: each spent 
East German mark brought only a return of roughly 0.07 German marks.60 
The other measures introduced in 1977 to save petrol and diesel fuels hardly 
involved the population and were initially almost without result.61 So in mid-
1978, suggestions were made to reduce oil imports from “non-socialist” mar-
kets by 1 million tons in 1979. These involved savings in heating oil through 
                                                             
57  Auswirkungen der verringerten Erdöllieferungen auf die Volkswirtschaft der DDR, 1.12.1981, 
BArch DE 1/58682. 
58  Calculation based on [Abt. Planung und Finanzen an Mittag:] Anforderungen, die an die 
Volkswirtschaft der DDR gestellt wurden, 21.11.1988, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1601, Bl. 182f., 
187f. However, the figures provided by the source material vary in part. Indeed, in the rele-
vant literature, Siegfried Wenzel’s figures are repeatedly cited (in Harm Schröter’s slightly 
distorted form), according to which the replacement of heating oil over three years and an 
expenditure of 15 thousand million marks released roughly 6 million tons of oil products, 
especially due to brown coal. (Wenzel 1992, 9; see also Schröter 1996, 118-9). An explana-
tion for the differences between the figures could not be found. All these figures should 
however be treated with some skepticism, given that they always served the purpose of jus-
tification.  
59  Zu wichtigen Fakten der ökonomischen Entwicklung der DDR insbesondere zur Erfüllung des 
Fünfjahrplans 1986-1990, 20.6.1988, BArch DE 1/58736, Bl. 358-370. 
60  Stokes 2013, 141. Stokes calculates even less – only 0.05 German marks – on the basis of an 
assumed 15-billion-mark investment. 
61  Möglichkeiten und Konsequenzen einer Reduzierung des Erdölimports aus dem NSW, 
5.5.1978, BArch DE 1/58647, Bl. 2-10. 
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further processing – that is to say, through better exploitation of the oil supply 
– in favor of more petrol and diesel fuel, as well as a certain restructuring of 
exports and imports of oil products. In addition, petrol consumption across 
industry, within the state administration, and within government bureaucracy 
was to be cut by 5 percent; diesel fuel consumption within transport, and agri-
culture was to be cut by 10 kilotons each; and heating oil consumption across 
nearly all areas was to be cut by 3 percent. Additional imports of natural gas 
were to replace further quantities of heating oil. The use of bitumen in con-
struction, road works, and elsewhere was especially reduced. Yet, fuel and heat 
provisions, as well as supplies of food and consumer goods, for the general 
population were to be fully guaranteed. Moreover, the Soviet military forces 
and Intertank – the petrol station operator which traded in exchange for West-
ern currency – still had to be supplied in full. In actuality, the savings target 
would have required further restrictions on petrol, which were not regarded as 
feasible, given that this would have involved getting rid of roughly 40 percent 
of the cars used by industry, the state administration, and government bureau-
cracy. The case for diesel was similar. The necessary reductions would have 
reduced road transport by roughly one quarter, which was thought impossible.62 
Nevertheless, these measures did evidently have some effect.63 All the same, 
once the Soviet Union had cut oil supplies to the GDR, even more reductions 
had to be made. While the public demand for petrol was to be guaranteed, 
industry and social institutions had to cut their fuel demands by one third in 1982, 
as compared to 1981. This would have involved eliminating 20,000 vehicles, 
which naturally would have had consequences for supplies in all areas. The use 
of diesel fuels was to be cut too, with ensuing consequences for local public 
transport. Even the army, police, and the Ministry of State Security were sup-
posed to introduce cuts.64 Evidently, the implementation of these measures was 
sometimes carried too far, leading Honecker to demand in May 1982, “Common 
sense is necessary […]. Now the whole affair has turned into a disaster. Surely 
we cannot allow a fuel shortage to endanger the workers’ and peasants’ state.”65 
                                                             
62  Material für die Beratung zur Entscheidung grundlegender Fragen zur Fertigstellung der 
Staatlichen Aufgaben 1979 bei Genossen Dr. Mittag am 12.6.1978: Siebold, Wambutt, 
Wyschofsky and Lesinski: Ergebnis und Entscheidungsvorschläge der Untersuchungen zur 
Verringerung des NSW-Imports 1979 um 1 Mt Erdöl, 9.6.1978, BArch DE 1/58647, Bl. 62-80.  
63  Niederschrift über die Beratung beim Genossen Mittag zu Fragen der Versorgung der DDR 
mit Brennstoffen und Energie und der rationellen Energieanwendung am Freitag, den 7. 
März 1980, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1125, Bl. 240-257. 
64  Auswirkungen der verringerten Erdöllieferungen auf die Volkswirtschaft der DDR, 1.12.1981, 
BArch DE 1/58682. 
65  P[olit]B[üro] 4.5.1982: Hinweise von Genossen Erich Honecker, BArch DE 1/58646. 
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A professed atheist, Honecker’s initial reaction to the second oil price shock 
was the declaration to SED leaders in November 1979, “Thank God we kept 
our coal chemistry!”66 However, only one month later, it emerged  
that the technological shape of the disproportionately old plants [in coal chem-
istry], set up 40 years ago and operated between 1964 and 1975 with no con-
sideration for wear, was significantly worse than had been recognized on 
8.3.1978, when the decision was made. 
Therefore the projected costs for the reconstruction of the coal chemical plants 
in Espenhain and Böhlen were doubled in the planning process. Elsewhere the 
costs were also much higher than initially projected. Moreover, a delay of 
many years was expected, given that there had been no forerun in terms of 
process engineering or project planning, and no certainty whether the machin-
ery and plant equipment would be available or construction work complete.67 
After the cuts in oil supplies, Honecker emphasized again in May 1982 that the 
USSR would not be supplying more oil. “So we’ll have to return to our tradi-
tional German techniques. After all, in the past, the big hydrogenation plants 
used to operate on GDR soil.”68 In the end, outdated and ecologically harmful 
low-temperature carbonization plants continued to be operated and expanded.  
5.  Results and Limitations  
Although the austerity measures described above reduced some of the waste of 
fuel and energy in industry and agriculture, the costs of fuel conversion were 
higher than the benefits of laying off oil products, except that foreign currency 
was gained with miserable results in the process, as has been shown. The sub-
stitution process bound up capital expenditure and other capacities, including 
mechanical engineering. These capacities were also urgently needed to mod-
ernize the national economy. As one fuel simply replaced another, the perfor-
mance of the GDR economy did not improve in real terms. The transition, 
especially, had disastrous consequences for the environment. Power stations 
were not sufficiently modernized and expenditure on the prevention of air 
pollution remained limited. While the output of brown coal increased by 19.7 
percent between 1980 and 1987, sulphur dioxide emissions rose by 30.4.69 The 
                                                             
66  Notizen zur Beratung des Politbüros des ZK der SED zum Planentwurf 1980 am 27. Novem-
ber 1979, 27.11.1979, BArch DE 1/58719, Bl. 434-456. 
67  Abt. Grundstoffindustrie des ZK der SED, Ministerium für Chemische Industrie, Ministerium 
für Kohle und Energie: Stellungnahme zum Informationsmaterial der Akademie der Wissen-
schaften der DDR über Stand und Probleme bei der Nutzung fossiler Kohlenstoffträger, 
11.12.1979, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1140, Bl.474-491. 
68  P[olit]B[üro] 4.5.1982: Hinweise von Genossen Erich Honecker, BArch DE 1/58646. 
69  Calculation based on: Statistisches Amt der DDR 1990, 146, 174. 
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ecological cost of opencast mining itself was also substantial. Although a major 
part of investments was channeled into the energy and fuel industry, only a 
minority of projects benefited. The end result was that the wear on machinery 
and plants within the energy and fuel industries as across industry in general, 
was comparatively high during the 1980s. So ultimately a high price was paid 
for achieving an export surplus. Such a strategy made sense only in the context 
of the GDR’s lack of hard currency and the possibility of increasing oil imports 
from the Soviet Union in exchange for the GDR’s own currency. While this 
guaranteed the short-term economic and political survival of the GDR, these 
processes also had a part to play in the GDR’s economic collapse. 
The root cause, however, lay in the Soviet-style centrally planned economy, 
with its lack of potential for innovation and efficiency. This, in turn, limited 
opportunity to generate the means that would have enabled a reaction to the 
economic problems caused at international level. Furthermore, and inherent to 
the deficits of this form of direction, decision makers received only weak sig-
nals as to where such means could be used most efficiently. However, it was 
also revealed that, even in a centrally controlled planned economy, it was not 
easy to push through a transition process as decreed from the central govern-
ment to factory levels. Within this system, the power of the central government 
also had its limitations.  
But in the face of the second oil price shock, Honecker had realized that the 
GDR could not be seen in isolation. In doing so, he casually dropped the Stalin-
ist theory of two world markets, one socialist and one capitalist, by emphasiz-
ing in 1979 that the “price increases on the international market (formerly, 
there were two markets)” should be counteracted.70 Until the latter phase of the 
GDR, he believed East Germany’s economic difficulties had their origin in the 
rise in fuel prices, especially for oil, and in the cuts in supplies from the Soviet 
Union.71 As the Ministry of State Security reported, leading SPK cadre members 
responded with “a lack of understanding” that “the Soviet Union is to blame for 
the complicated national economic situation that has arisen in the GDR due to the 
cuts in fuel supplies.” They were “disappointed” that the SED leadership “failed 
to provide any orientation towards solving these fundamental problems. In their 
opinion, short-term decisions had been made that had neither created an eco-
nomic upturn nor solved the problem of the balance of payments.”72 Günter 
Mittag shared Honecker’s opinion and emphasized, “Otherwise […] the incom-
                                                             
70  Notizen zur Beratung des Politbüros des ZK der SED zum Planentwurf 1980 am 27. Novem-
ber 1979, 27.11.1979, BArch DE 1/58719, Bl. 434-456. 
71  Cf. for example: [Wenzel:] Arbeitsniederschrift über eine Beratung beim Generalsekretär des 
ZK der SED, Genossen Erich Honecker, zu den Materialien des Entwurfs der staatlichen Auf-
gaben 1989, 6.9.88, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1600, Bl. 136-140. 
72  HA XVIII [des MfS]: Information über die Ergebnisse der am 6.9.1988 unter Leitung des 
Generalsekretärs der SED, Gen. E. Honecker, stattgefundenen Beratung im „kleinen Kreis“, 
7.9.1988, SAPMO-BA DY 3023/1600, Bl.128. 
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petence of planning and of the planned economy in general will be revealed.”73 
But that was the key issue. In the end, and aside from the social costs, the Federal 
Republic – the benchmark for the SED leadership and the East German popula-
tion – had successfully dealt with the consequences of the oil price crises through 
an economic structural change known as the Strukturwandel. 
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